Motor Simulation and the Bodily Self by Ferri, Francesca et al.
Motor Simulation and the Bodily Self
Francesca Ferri
1*, Francesca Frassinetti
2, Marcello Costantini
3,4, Vittorio Gallese
1,5
1Department of Neuroscience, University of Parma, Parma, Italy, 2Department of Psychology, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy, 3Department of Neuroscience and
Imaging, University G. d’Annunzio, Chieti, Italy, 4Institute for Advanced Biomedical Technologies (ITAB), Foundation University G. d’Annunzio, Chieti, Italy, 5Brain Center
for Social and Motor Cognition, Italian Institute of Technology, Parma, Italy
Abstract
Previous studies demonstrated the human ability to implicitly recognize their own body. When submitted to a visual
matching task, participants showed the so-called self-advantage, that is, a better performance with self rather than others’
body or body parts. Here, we investigated whether the body self-advantage relies upon a motor representation of one’s
body. Participants were submitted to a laterality judgment of self and others’ hands (Experiment 1 and 3), which involves a
sensory-motor mental simulation. Moreover, to investigate whether the self-advantage emerges also when an explicit self
processing is required, the same participants were submitted to an explicit self-body recognition task (Experiment 2).
Participants showed the self-advantage when performing the laterality judgment, but not when self-recognition was
explicitly required. Thus, implicit and explicit recognition of the bodily self dissociate and only an implicit recognition of the
bodily self, mapped in motor terms, allows the self-advantage to emerge.
Citation: Ferri F, Frassinetti F, Costantini M, Gallese V (2011) Motor Simulation and the Bodily Self. PLoS ONE 6(3): e17927. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017927
Editor: Ben Harrison, The University of Melbourne, Australia
Received November 2, 2010; Accepted February 16, 2011; Published March 25, 2011
Copyright:  2011 Ferri et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work was supported by grants from the Ministry of University and Research to Francesca Frassinetti and Vittorio Gallese, and from the EU grant
DISCOS (http://www.schattauer-discos.de) to Vittorio Gallese. Francesca Ferri was supported by the EU grant ROSSI (http://win.rossiproject.net). The funders had
no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: francesca.ferri@nemo.unipr.it
Introduction
Neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies show that the
body is a ‘‘unique’’ object. Indeed, specific brain structures are
involved in the visual processing of the human body [1], [2], [3].
Viewing non-facial body parts selectively activates a lateral
occipito-temporal cortex (OTC), called extrastriate body area
(EBA), and an area located in the fusiform gyrus, known as
fusiform body area (FBA) [3], [4], [5]. Moreover, a topograph-
ically organized body part map has been described within the
OTC, with distinct clusters of voxels showing clear preference for
different visually presented body parts [6]. In line with this
evidence, a hand-selective region has been recently revealed in the
left lateral occipital sulcus, partially overlapping with EBA, which
could be functionally and anatomically dissociated from it [7].
When processing a human body, a critical distinction can be
made between one’s own body and the body of others [8], [9].
Studies using different methods (behavioral, fMRI, TMS studies)
have shown that the recognition of ‘‘self body’’ is independent
from the recognition of other people’s bodies. Interestingly, self-
related body stimuli are processed faster and more accurately
compared to other-related body stimuli (self-advantage, see [10],
[11]). This advantage for self body processing was revealed by a
visual task in which an explicit self body recognition was not
required. Participants were submitted to a matching task in which
three pictures, representing a body part (hand, foot, arm and leg),
were presented vertically aligned at the centre of the computer
screen. They were asked which of the two stimuli, the upper or the
lower one, matched with the central target. Participants’ perfor-
mance was more accurate when one of the stimuli belonged to
them compared to when they belonged to someone else.
The mechanism supporting the body self-advantage is still
under debate. One hypothesis is that bodily self recognition is
based on a sensory-motor representation (for a review, see [12]).
The main aim of the present study is to shed new light on the
implicit body self-advantage. To this purpose, we investigated the
contribution of visuo-motor body representation with two different
tasks. In a first experiment (Experiment 1) healthy participants
were submitted to a laterality judgment task with either self or
others’ hands as body stimuli. In a second experiment (Experiment
2) we employed the same stimuli as in Experiment 1, but asked
participants to explicitly recognize their own hand. Finally, in a
third control experiment (Experiment 3) we ruled out the possi-
bility that the results of the first experiment were simply driven by
any sort of familiarity of ‘‘priming’’ effects.
In the laterality judgment task (Experiments 1 and 3)
participants were requested to report the laterality (left or right)
of depicted body parts presented in different angular orientations.
We adopted this task because it is well known that in order to
perform it participants simulate a motor rotation of their own body
parts so as to match that of the observed stimulus [13], [14]. Mental
motor rotation of body parts shares the same temporal and
kinematic properties with actual body rotation in space [13], [15],
[16], [17], [18], [19]. This idea is further corroborated by
evidence showing that longer mental rotation times are needed for
stimuli orientations corresponding to body part positions difficult
to be maintained [13], [20], [21]. Since previous studies [22], [23]
suggest that the left-right judgment of body parts relies upon the
visuo-motor representation of one’s own body, we hypothesize that
the laterality judgment in Experiments 1 and 3 should be easier
when the displayed stimulus is one’s own hand. Indeed, only in this
case, the displayed stimulus matches with the mentally rotated
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tion of one’s own body is crucial for the self-advantage.
Interestingly, the self-advantage described in previous studies
[10], [11], [24] has been found without requiring an explicit self
body recognition, as it emerged on the basis of a mere implicit self-
body recognition. As a consequence, the explicit recognition of
one’s own body does not seem to be necessary for the emergence
of the self-advantage. To address the question of whether the
requirement of explicitly recognizing one’s own body is a sufficient
condition for the emergence of the self-advantage, we ran a second
experiment using the very same stimuli of the Experiment 1. Here
(Experiment 2), participants were asked to explicitly recognize the
identity of the displayed hand, that could be either the
participants’ or other people’s hands. If the requirement of explicit
self recognition is a sufficient condition for the self-advantage, this
should be found also in the Experiment 2. Alternatively, a
dissociation between implicit and explicit self body processing
should be found.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-four right-handed healthy participants (mean age=37,5
years; range 20–55), naive as to the purpose of the study,
participated in each experiment. The same participants (12 men
and 12 women) took part in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. A
different group of participants (14 men and 10 women) took part in
Experiment 3. Participants had no history of neurological diseases
as self reported. All participants gave their written informed consent
for participation in the study. The experimental protocol was
approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Parma.
Stimuli and Procedure
The experimental stimuli consisted of grey-scale pictures of the
dorsal view of right and left hands (see Figure 1). The hands of
each participant were photographed with a digital camera in a
session prior to the experiments (1 week before). This session took
place in a controlled environment with constant artificial light and
a fixed distance between the camera lens and the hands (40 cm),
which were always photographed in the same position. Subse-
quently, photographs were modified with Adobe Photoshop
software: they were cut from the original picture, pasted on a
white background, and reoriented into the different rotated
positions. Other people’s hands were selected from this database
as the best match for size, skin color, age, and gender, in
comparison with each participant’s hands. The sizes of the hands
were compared in the pictures, in order to minimize the
differences between matched hands both in length and in width.
In addition, the ages of the people whose hands were matched
with the participants’ hands varied within 0 to 3 years of the
participants’ ages.
Images of hands were presented one at a time at the centre of
the computer screen in six different clockwise orientations from
the upright (0u,6 0 u, 120u, 180u, 240u, 300u). The upright
orientation was defined as fingers pointing upwards.
Stimuli depicted the participant’s own left or right hand in half
of the trials (‘self’ trials). In the other half of the trials, stimuli
depicted the right or left hand of other three people (‘other’ trials,
Experiments 1 and 2). In Experiment 3 stimuli presented in the
‘other’ trials depicted the right or left hand of only one other
individual. This methodological change was done to control for
‘‘priming’’ or familiarity effects that might occur in the laterality
judgment task.
Participants sat in front of a PC screen, at a distance of about
30 cm. Stimuli presentation was controlled by E-Prime (Psychol-
ogy Software Tools Inc., [25], [26]). Each trial started with a
central fixation cross (500 ms duration), followed by stimulus
presentation. The trial was timed-out as soon as participants
responded (up to 4000 ms).
In Experiment 1 and 3 participants were required to judge the
laterality (left or right) of observed digital images of hands by
pressing as accurately as possible and within the allowed time
interval, a left or a right response key, with their left and right
index fingers, respectively.
In Experiment 2, participants were required to explicitly judge
whether the displayed hand corresponded or not to their own
hand by pressing as accurately as possible and within the allowed
time interval, a left or a right previously assigned response key,
with their left and right index fingers, respectively. The response
keys were counterbalanced between subjects.
Each Experiment consisted of 288 trials, 72 trials for each of the
four conditions: self-right, self-left, other-right, other-left. In
particular, in Experiment 1 and 2 the self right and left hand
stimuli were shown to participants 72 times each; others’ right and
Figure 1. Stimuli. Experimental stimuli consisted of pictures depicting the dorsal view of right and left hands in six different clockwise orientations.
Images of participant’s hands or of three other people’s hands were presented one at a time in ‘self’ trials and ‘other’ trials, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017927.g001
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possibility that higher repetition rates of self, compared to others’
stimuli led to a ‘‘priming’’ effect during the laterality judgment
task, a control Experiment 3 was performed. In this experiment
others’ right and left hands belonged to only one ‘‘other’’
individual. Thus, self and others’ right and left hands were shown
72 times each. In all the three experiments, each orientation was
randomly depicted 12 times per condition. Experiments were
always preceded by a task-specific practice block.
Since Experiment 1 investigated the implicit and Experiment 2
the explicit self-bodily recognition, Experiment 1 was always
conducted before Experiment 2. The same group of participants
performed both Experiments in one single session. Experiment 3
was administered in a separate session to a different group of
participants.
Results
Results of Experiment 1
Data are shown in Figure 2. To test the presence of self-
advantage with the laterality judgment task, an ANOVA was
conducted on participants’ reaction times (RTs), with Owner
(one’s own and other people’s stimuli), Laterality (left and right),
and Orientation (0u,6 0 u, 120u, 180u, 240u and 300u) as within-
subject factors. The Newman-Keuls test was used for all post-hoc
comparisons.
The ANOVA revealed the significance of the main effect of
Laterality [F(1,23)=9.28, p,.006, gp
2=.29], since RTs to right
stimuli were faster than RTs to left stimuli (1028 ms vs 1100 ms).
The factor Orientation was also significant [F(5,115)=57.74,
p,.001, gp
2=.72]. This effect was accounted for by faster RTs at
0u,6 0 u and 300u (839, 893, 898 ms, respectively) compared to
RTs at 120u, 180u, 240u (1155, 1472, 1128 ms, respectively;
p,.001 in all cases). The Laterality by Orientation interaction was
also significant [F(5,115)=4.01, p,.002, gp
2=.15], because of
the faster performance with right than left stimuli at 0u (771 ms vs.
908 ms), 240u (1064 ms vs.1192 ms), and 300u (822 ms vs.
974 ms, p,.01 for all comparisons). Relevant to the main goal
of the study, the interaction Owner by Laterality was also
significant [F(1,23)=5.82, p,.02, gp
2=.20]. The interaction was
explained by faster RTs to right self stimuli compared to right
others’ stimuli (1007 ms vs. 1048 ms, p,.05, see Figure 2). No
significant difference was observed for left hands between self and
others’ stimuli (1114 ms vs. 1087 ms, p=.19). Moreover, RTs to
self-right stimuli were faster than RTs to self-left ones (and other-
left; p,.002 for all comparisons), whereas only a trend to
significance was found between other-right and other-left stimuli
(p=.07).
When the same analysis was conducted on accuracy (percentage
of correct responses), only the factor Orientation was significant
F[(5,115)=20.2, p,.0003, gp
2=.47], being subjects less accurate
at 180u (76%) than at all other orientations (0u=96%, 60u=97%,
120u=91%, 240u=92%, 300u=96%, p,.0001 for all compar-
isons). The other orientations were not significantly different.
Results of Experiment 2
Data are shown in Figure 3. An ANOVA similar to that of
Experiment 1 and 2 was conducted on participants’ reaction times
(RTs), with Owner, Laterality and Orientation as within-subject
factors.
The factor Owner was significant F[(1,23)=18.66, p,.001,
gp
2=.45], since participants responded faster to others’ than to
self stimuli (814 vs 997 ms, see Figure 3). No other significant
effects were found.
The same analysis conducted on accuracy (percentage of correct
responses) confirmed a worse performance with self than with
others’ stimuli (76% vs 91%, F[(1,23)=11.29, p,.001, gp
2=.33]).
Results of Experiment 3
To rule out the possibility that the presence of the self-
advantage for right hands with the laterality judgment task was
due to any sort of familiarity or ‘‘priming’’ effect, we asked a new
group of participants to perform the same task in the control
Experiment 3. In this experiment, each self and other’s stimulus
was shown the same number of times. An ANOVA was conducted
on participants’ reaction times (RTs), with Owner (one’s own and
Figure 2. Experiment 1. Mean response times (upper panel) and
accuracy (bottom panel) at the different self’ and others’ hands stimuli
orientations in the Implicit task. Error bars depict the standard error of
the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017927.g002
Figure 3. Experiment 2. Mean response times (upper panel) and
accuracy (bottom panel) at the different self’ and others’ hands stimuli
orientations in the Explicit task. Error bars depict the standard error of
the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017927.g003
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(0u,6 0 u, 120u, 180u, 240u and 300u) as within-subject factors. The
Newman-Keuls test was used for all post-hoc comparisons.
The ANOVA revealed the significance of the main effect of
Laterality [F(1,23)=6.1, p,.05, gp
2=.21], since RTs to right
stimuli were faster than RTs to left stimuli (838 ms vs 867 ms).
The factor Orientation was also significant [F(5,115)=23.9,
p,.001, gp
2=.86]. This effect was accounted for by faster RTs
at 0u,6 0 u and 300u (704, 755, 732 ms, respectively) compared to
RTs at 120u, 180u, 240u (888, 1165, 870 ms, respectively; p,.001
in all cases). Most interestingly, the significance of the interaction
Owner by Laterality, found in Experiment 1, was confirmed in the
present control experiment [F(1,23)=4.5, p,.05, gp
2=.16].
Once again this interaction was explained by faster RTs to right
self stimuli compared to right others’ stimuli (831 ms vs. 844 ms,
p,.05). No significant difference was observed for left hands
between self and others’ stimuli (868 ms vs. 865 ms, p=.55).
Moreover, RTs to self-right stimuli were faster than RTs to self-left
ones (and other-left; p,.0002 for all comparisons). Similarly, RTs
to other-right stimuli were faster than RTs to other-left ones (and
self-left; p,.002 for all comparisons).
When the same analysis was conducted on accuracy (percentage
of correct responses), only the factor Orientation was significant
F[(5,115)=14.8, p,.001, gp
2=.60], being participants less
accurate at 180u (86%) than at all other orientations (0u=97%,
60u=97%, 120u=95%, 240u=96%, 300u=97%, p,.001 for all
comparisons). The other orientations were not significantly
different.
Discussion
In this study we investigated whether and to what extent the so-
called self-advantage [10], [11], [24] is based on a motor
simulation. To this aim healthy participants were submitted to a
hand laterality judgment task. Crucially, the hand to be judged
could be either the participants’ own hand or other people’s hand.
Results showed an advantage when judging one’s own right
compared to others’ hands. Such an advantage was reflected by
faster reaction times when responding to the former stimulus
compared to the latter ones (Experiment 1 and 3). It is worth
noting that this advantage was present in a task in which explicit
self recognition was not required. By contrast, the self advantage
was lacking in the second experiment where self recognition was
explicitly required. Indeed, a worse performance with self-related
stimuli compared to other-related stimuli was observed.
Experiments 1 and 3 differed from Experiment 2 with respect to
two main variables. The first one is the motor strategy required to
solve the task, present in the laterality judgment task (Experiment
1 and 3), but not in the self-body recognition task (Experiment 2).
In order to perform the laterality judgment task a mental motor
rotation of body parts is required [22], [13], [18], [14].
Coherently, the classical bell-shaped function of RTs found for
this task (see Figure 2) constitutes the behavioral signature of
mental rotation. On the other hand, the absence of such a function
in the RTs of the self-body recognition task (see Figure 3) shows
that a motor simulation is not required to accomplish the explicit
task. For these reasons the presence of the self-advantage in
Experiment 1 and 3, and its absence in Experiment 2 suggest that
the bodily self is ultimately linked to a motor representation.
The second variable is the requirement to explicitly recognize
self stimuli, which characterizes the second, but not the first and
the third experiments. Our data demonstrate that the request of an
explicit recognition of one’s own body does not lead to the
emergence of the self-advantage. Thus, explicit body processing is
per se neither necessary nor sufficient to grant the body self-
advantage.
We are aware the two tasks required two different responses,
thus they cannot be directly compared to each other. However, to
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study investigating the
implicit and explicit self bodily knowledge by means of the very
same stimuli and the same experimental procedure. The idea of a
dissociation between implicit and explicit self body processing is in
agreement with the large amount of neuropsychological studies
showing that brain damaged patients can be impaired in explicit
while sparing implicit processing. A typical clinical condition in
which implicit and explicit processes are dissociated is neglect.
Neglect patients fail to explicitly detect stimuli presented in the
contralesional affected field. However, they can implicitly process
the same stimuli up to the semantic level [27], [28]. Regarding the
bodily self, such dissociation is in agreement with the indepen-
dence of implicit from explicit self-body processing reported by
infancy research. Indeed, during development an implicit sense of
self and the ability to discriminate self from others appears to
emerge earlier than the ability to explicitly self-recognize [29],
[30].
Taken together, data from Experiments 1 (confirmed by
Experiment 3) and 2, although not directly comparable to each
other, suggest that the crucial element for the self-advantage to
emerge is the recruitment of a motor simulation. This interpre-
tation is in agreement with and provides a coherent explanation to
a variety of previous studies. Tsakiris et al. [31] carried out a study
in which participants had to decide whether they viewed their own
right hand or someone else’s right hand covered with identical
gloves, while experiencing a passive displacement of their own
right index finger, either generated by the experimenter or by
participants’ own left hand. The results showed that the perfor-
mance was significantly better when the displacement of
participants’ right index finger was self-generated. As argued by
Tsakiris, Schutz-Bosbach, & Gallagher [32], this shows that ‘‘Self
recognition was significantly more accurate when subjects
themselves were the authors of the action’’ (p. 654–655).
Coherently, visual and motor related information converge within
the OTC in a body part specific manner [8], and the feeling of
ownership of the hand positively correlates with activity in the
premotor cortex [33].
In a behavioral study Loula, Prasad, Harber, & Shiffrar [34]
asked participants to perform a self identification task while
observing sagittal displays of point-light depictions of themselves,
their friends, and strangers while performing various actions. They
found higher sensitivity to one’s own motion. Since everyone has
little experience of viewing her own body moving, such self-
advantage can be easily explained by the activation of observers’
own action motor representation. Similarly, a self-advantage was
demonstrated by Casile & Giese [35] in a behavioral task, in which
only non-visual motor training was available to participants.
The last point to be addressed is the presence of the self-
advantage only for participants’ right hand. Such selectivity is a
further argument in favor of our motor hypothesis of the self-
advantage. The presence of the ‘‘self-advantage’’ only for the right
hand can be explained by the greater lateralization in hand motor
skills observed in right-handers compared to left-handers (e.g.,
[36]). Neuroimaging studies have shown hemispheric asymmetries
in cortical areas associated with body representation in right-
handed people, but not in left-handed people. Indeed, right-
handed individuals have a greater cortical surface area in the left
sensory cortex and stronger activation in the left sensory-motor
cortex while performing right hand movements than in the
corresponding areas of the right hemisphere. In contrast, left-
Mental Rotation of the Bodily Self
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and activations [37], [38], [39]. Similar results have been observed
with electroencephalographic (EEG) studies [40], [41]. Further-
more, it was recently shown that right-handers perceive their own
right arm and hand as being longer than their left ones, whereas
left-handers perceive both arms and hands accurately [42]. Thus,
it appears that the conscious perception of the body is grounded
on its motor potentialities [43].
Since according to our data the self-advantage relies upon a
sensory-motor representation, the presence of the self-advantage
only for self right hand stimuli is likely the consequence of the
greater involvement of the left, rather than the right, sensory-
motor areas in right-handers during a mental motor task. Given
such a near-symmetrical cortical representation in left-handers,
future studies on this population might help us to shed new light
on this phenomenon. Recent data seem to support our hypothesis.
Conson and colleagues [44] asked right-handed and left-handed
healthy participants to categorize full-colored pictures of hands,
presented according to the egocentric or the allocentric perspec-
tive, as belonging to themselves or to other people. They found
that both right- and left-handers were faster in recognizing
dominant hands (right and left hand, respectively) in egocentric
perspective, and others’ non-dominant hands in allocentric
perspective.
Possibly one may argue that the self advantage we found in
Experiment 1 can be construed in terms of ‘‘priming’’ effect or any
sort of visual familiarity. Indeed, in this experiment self stimuli
were presented 72 times while each of the three others’ stimuli was
presented only 24 times. To deal with this possible concern, we ran
a third control experiment in which we used the hands of only one
other individual, thus matching the number of occurrences of each
stimulus in terms of identity. We found the same results as in
Experiment 1. This rules out the possibility that the self advantage
is exclusively due to ‘‘priming’’ effects. Regarding visual familia-
rity, we believe something different might underpin our behavioral
effect. Indeed, out of the total of self-related trials, one half
involved the presentation of the right hand while the other half
involved the presentation of the left hand. It follows that if
perceptual familiarity could fully explain our results, it is not clear
why our effect was visible only for right hand stimuli. Our idea is
also corroborated by a recent study [45] exploring whether
symbolic cues, predicting the appearance of one’s own or another
person’s hand could optimize the processing of these stimuli.
Results showed a selective attentional effect with one’s own hand,
but not with someone else’s hand. More relevant for the purpose of
our study, in a control experiment the authors tested whether this
selective attentional effect could be due to the higher perceptual
familiarity. Results showed that participants could use the cues to
anticipate the appearance of both stimuli, since a behavioral
advantage was observed for all valid stimuli, regardless of their
degree of familiarity.
In conclusion, our data demonstrate that implicit and explicit
recognition of the bodily self dissociate and that, only when bodily
self recognition is implicit, a self-advantage does emerge. Since the
implicit mechanism recruits a motor simulation, it follows that the
bodily self is primarily mapped in motor terms. Indeed, when
explicit self recognition is required and different cognitive and/or
perceptually-based mechanisms are likely involved, the self-
advantage is lacking. The idea of the motor nature of the bodily
self is in agreement with previous philosophical intuitions.
Merleau-Ponty posited that our body appears to us as an attitude
directed towards a certain existing or possible tasks. When
referring to the spatiality of the body he claimed: ‘‘[…] my body
appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or
possible task. And indeed its spatiality is not, like that of external
objects […], a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation’’.
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